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JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal by L. Stanley Bell and Eagar, Inc. ("Appellants") from the June 11, 
2001 final judgment of the Honorable Rodney F. Page of the Second Judicial District Court 
of Davis County, State of Utah in awarding attorneys5 fees to appellants in the amount of 
$10,500.00. Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2-2(4) (1996), this appeal was 
assigned to this court which has jurisdiction under Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-
3(2)0) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court correctly reduce the attorneys' fees requested by Appellants 
under the holding of Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 746 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988)? 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW 
Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 746 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988) is determinative. See 
Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This action involves the purchase by appellants of Appellee's business. Appellee was 
in the aquaculture business, selling equipment and supplies to fish hatcheries. 
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Appellee had founded this business, and worked in it for a number of years, but had 
decided to sell his business. This led to the offer to purchase the business by appellant Bell. 
Appellant Bell offered to purchase the business at a specified price of $575,000.00, and 
which included obtaining lease of premises used by the business, which were also owned by 
Appellee, for $2,281.00 per month (the amount paid by the corporation at the time of the 
sale) for a term often years. The parties ultimately agreed on the sales price and terms for 
the business, including a five year lease of premises at the rate of $2,281.00 per month, 
subject to annual adjustments based upon the consumer price index after the second year and 
a five year option to extend the lease upon the same terms, subject to adjustment to reflect 
changes in the consumer price index. Appellee failed to produce the lease as required by the 
agreement and Appellants filed suit to enforce the provisions of said lease. The trial court 
ordered that Appellee enter into the lease with Appellants. The Court subsequently heard 
and granted appellants' motion for attorneys fees, but reduced the amount of the award from 
$84,598.98 as requested by appellants to $10,500.00. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
The trial court granted Appellants" motion for partial summary judgment and denied 
Appellee's motion for summary judgment on May 12, 1999. R. 539-541; R. 590 at 28-30. 
The Court awarded partial attorney's fees to the Appellant on the 26th day of October, 
2000. 
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C. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant Bell purchased the business in January of 1997. He learned of the business 
through a broker with the Business Resource Center, a business brokerage company, in the 
fall of 1996. Since he was interested in purchasing the business, he made an offer to 
purchase the business. The terms of the offer included the terms, purchase price and payment 
for the assets of the business amounting to $575,000.00, and a requirement that the building, 
which was also owned by Appellee, be leased to Appellants upon the same terms and 
conditions as it had been leased to the company at the time of the sale for a period often (10) 
years from the date of sale. R. 64. 
In response to his offer, Appellee received a counter offer modifying the terms of 
purchase, and specifying that a five year lease at current rate of $2,281.00 per month subject 
to adjustment pursuant to the consumer price index annually after the second year, together 
with an option to extend the lease upon the same terms for an additional five year term. 
R.71. Appellants accepted Appellee's counteroffer. The lease is offered to Appellant by 
Appellee would have resulted in an increase in the rental amount of approximately $ 1,000.00 
per month and was limited to three years. 
Appellants and Appellee subsequently executed a Release of Contingencies, again 
stating the terms of the lease as outlined herein, and entered into a purchase agreement for 
the business. R. 71. Appellants agreed that Appellee would subsequently present a lease 
embodying these terms agreed upon to Appellants. Although several draft leases were 
Page -3-
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presented none of them embodied the terms agreed upon in the Counteroffer. R. 73 -76,252-299. 
The trial court found that the Counteroffer and Contingency Removal were 
unambiguous and that Appellants were entitled to declaratory judgment establishing the 
existence of the lease and requiring that Appellee provide a written lease to Appellants. R. 
590 at 27. The trial court further denied Appellee's motion for summary judgment. R. 590 
at 27-30. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court October 26, 2000. 
Appellants filed a motion for attorneys' fees as provided by the contract in the amount 
of $84,598.98. The trial court granted the motion of Appellants, but reduced the amount of 
the attorney's fees awarded to $10,500.00. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial courts conclusion below, that Plaintiff's attorneys fees were excessive failed 
to properly apply the principles enunciated in Dixie v. Bracken. There is no evidence in the 
record to demonstrate that the Appellants' attorney's fees were anything other than a reaction 
to the Appellees groundless breach of contract by Appellee. 
The Appellant is entitled to attorneys fees for enforcing the agreement through 
negotiation, mediation as well as litigation. 
?
 The Appellees baseless breach of contract should not be rewarded by failure to order 
all attorneys fees incurred by Appellant. 
Page -4-
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ARGUMENT 
A. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO CORRECTLY APPLY THE RULES 
ENUNCIATED BY THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH IN DETERMINING 
ATTORNEYS'FEES 
The underlying agreement between the parties provided for attorneys fees. The trial 
court held the following provision of the purchase agreement to be applicable: 
"Should any party to this agreement default, the non-defaulting party shall be 
entitled to a reasonable attorneys fee and costs to enforce this agreement..." 
R. 821. 
The trial court stated: 
"[T]he Court concludes that in failing to provide that lease, Defendant 
breached the agreement and , therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to a reasonable 
attorneys fee pursuant to the terms of the agreement. R.821 
The Supreme Court of the state of Utah clearly and concisely listed the factors to be 
evaluated by a trial court in determining the amount of attorney's fees to be awarded in the 
cases of Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 746 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988): 
[T]he relationship of the fee to the amount recovered, the novelty and 
difficulty of the issues involved, the overall result achieved and the necessity 
of initiating a lawsuit to vindicate the rights under the contract. Trayner v. 
Cashing, 688 P.2d 856, at 858 (Utah 1984). 
[T]he difficulty of the litigation, the efficiency of the attorneys in presenting 
the case, the reasonableness of the number of hours spent on the case, the fee 
customarily charged in the locality for similar services, the amount involved 
in the case and the result attained, and the expertise and experience of the 
attorneys involved. Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622, at 625 (Utah 1983). 
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The court finally summarizes its rules as follows: 
Although all of the above factors may be explicitly considered in determining 
a reasonable fee, as a practical matter the trial court should find the answ ers 
to four questions: 
1. What legal work was actually performed? 
2. How much of the work performed was reasonably 
necessary to adequately prosecute the matter? 
3* Is the attorney's billing rate consistent with the rates 
customarily charged in the locality for similar services? 
4. Are there circumstances which require consideration of 
additional factors, including those listed in the Code of 
Professional Responsibility? 
JL What legal work was actually performed? 
The legal work required by this matter was extensive. Appellee was represented by 
three separate law firms before the matter was finally brought to trial. Appellants began by 
attempting to negotiate a lease embodying the required terms with Appellee's original 
counsel. The only leases purposed by Appellee's at that time increased the rent to be 
charged by a material amount and reduced the term of the lease. When Appellants insisted 
on their rights as set forth in the purchase agreement Appellee refused further negotiation. 
Appellee then moved to his second law firm. After extensive negotiations with 
Appellee's new attorney Appellants agreed to participate in mediation in an effort to resolve 
the issue. After the preparation of memoranda for the mediation, and a full day of meetings 
with the mediator, Appellants thought that a resolution had been reached. However, the 
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Appellee refused to execute the agreement that had been negotiated and left the mediation. 
R.615-616. 
After the failed mediation, the Appellee moved to his third law firm. Appellants again 
engaged in good faith negotiations with respect to the lease for the third time, and again 
received no lease offers that were mandated by the parties unambiguous agreement. At that 
point with no recourse remaining Appellants filed the present action. 
Despite extensive negotiations through three separate law firms and one failed 
mediation, the Appellee continually refused to enter into the lease required by the parties 
agreement. The trial court ultimately held that the parties agreement requiring the lease was 
unambiguous and required Appellee to enter into the lease and that "the law applicable in 
this case was simple horn book law." 
The court below implied without reliance upon a single fact that Appellant had 
performed unnecessary legal work on a relatively simple matter. 
The plain facts before the court are that the Appellee compelled the Appellant to take 
each and every step it took to prosecute its rights under the parties agreement. 
The Appellee could have stopped the process and resolved the legal issues at any time 
by complying with what the trial court and the Court of Appeals referred to as a simple and 
unambiguous contract. Instead the Appellee exercised its right to litigate, a right which is 
tempered and controlled only be the parties contractual obligation to pay costs and attorneys 
at the conclusion of the matter. 
Page -7-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Failure to award attorneys in the face of the Appellees thoughtless litigious conduct 
is nothing short of a reward for the conduct. 
Failure to award attorneys fees has the direct effect of punishing Appellant for 
standing up to Appellees in what the trial court implied was groundless litigation. 
The Appellee could have accepted the trial courts decision, but instead appealed, 
compelling the Appellant to expend attorneys fees to obtain that to which all courts have held 
it was entitled. 
Where a party to a contract breaches the contract, the non-defaulting party has two 
choices: 
1. First, accept the breach and attendant losses (in the case before the 
court approximately $250,000.00, or 
2. Second, vindicate its rights under the contract through first negotiation, 
then mediation, and finally litigation. 
In the case before the court, the Appellee who was in default, could have ended the 
costs and fees at any time by simply curing the default. Unfortunately the only way to 
escape the litigation train for the Appellant was to capitulate. Instead of capitulation, the 
Appellant chose to vindicate its rights. '" 
The parties engaged in normal discovery practice exchanging interrogatories, and 
requests for production of documents. Each party also took a full day depositions of the 
opposing party. 
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Appellant moved for summary judgement and Appellee filed its own motion for 
counter summary judgment. Appellee also filed an extensive Rule 56(f) motion, Appellants 
desiring to simplify the litigation process did not oppose the 56(f) motion. Appellants 
ultimately filed both an opposition memorandum and a supplemental memorandum in 
opposition in connection with Appellant's motion. All of which required extensive analysis 
and response by Appellants. 
Appellants ultimately prevailed on their motion for summary judgement, and 
Appellee's motion was denied. Appellee then objected to the order submitted by Appellants 
which resulted in additional negotiation and filing of motion papers. Appellee finally 
appealed the courts order. Since no final judgement had been entered in the case the review 
of additional motion papers and memoranda to facilitate the interlocutory appeal were 
necessary. 
Once the appeal was granted Appellants were required to prepare a brief and engage 
in all the other actions required by an appeal. 
Appellants prevailed on appeal and submitted its motion for attorneys' fees. Once 
again this precipitated a firestorm of memoranda by Appellee's council. Appellants attempt 
to engage in additional discovery to verify the facts alleged in Appellee's affidavits and 
memoranda, but the trial court lost patience with the matter and ruled on the motion. 
Thus it can be seen that it has been necessary for Appellants to incur extensive 
attorneys fees. 
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2^  How much of the work performed was reasonably necessary to adequately 
prosecute the matter? 
Council for Appellants have engaged only in responsive action to actions taken by 
Appellee's council with the exception of two items: first, taking the deposition of Appellee 
and preparing written interrogatories and requests for documents, which is necessary to the 
litigation and second, to file the motion for summary judgement which resolved this matter 
short of a lengthy and costly trial. 
The court below rebuked the Appellant for asking for fees which were incurred 
sixteen months before the complaint was filed. The contractual agreement for attorneys fees 
is not limited to those fees incurred in litigation, it provides for attorney fees to the non-
defaulting party to enforce the agreement. The appellant should not be punished for 
attempting negotiation and mediation before litigation. 
The trial courts ruling on summary judgment and this Courts affirmation of that ruling 
means that as a matter of law the appellee was in default of the agreement as soon as it failed 
to provide the lease agreement. 
There is no legal support for the trial court to fail to award attorneys fees because the 
Appellant took the reasonable steps to negotiate and mediate and negotiate some more. 
Negotiations and mediation are within the meaning of the non-defaulting party enforcing the 
terms of the contract. 
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3. Is the attorneys billing rate consistent with rates customarily charged in 
the locality for similar services? 
Although the trial court did not allow discovery on this issue the court ruled that the 
appropriate hourly rate was $175.00, R.826 . 
4a Are there circumstances which require consideration of additional factors? 
In the Dixie State Bank case the court stated: "[M]ore importantly the fees incurred 
by the bank were increased several-fold over what they should have been by tactics 
employed by the Brackens." Much can be said about this case. It was the unwillingness of 
Appellee to negotiate in good faith which led to mediation. It was the unwillingness of 
Appellee to engage in good faith mediation that led to litigation. 
Once the litigation began it was the voluminous motions and counter motions of 
Appellee that required additional expenditures of time by Appellants' attorneys. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Appellants respectfully request that this Court set aside the 
decision of the trial court and order attorneys fees as requested by Appellants. 
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Dated this /;?# day of December, 2001. 
BLACK, STITH & ARGYLE, P.C. 
Lesley C. 
David O. 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs, Counterclaim Defendants 
and Appellants Eagar, Inc. and L. Stanley Bell 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 12$ day of December, 2001, I caused two true and 
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ADDENDUM 
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Utah Case Law 
DIXIE> <STATE> <BANK v. BRACKEN, 764 P. 2d 985 (Utah 1988) 
764 P. 2d 985 
DIXIE STATE BANK, A UTAH CORPORATION, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, v. KIRK 
BRACKEN AND LINFORD BRACKEN, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES. 
No. 19375. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
October 25, 1988. 
Appeal from the Fifth District Court, Washington County, J. 
Harlan Burns, J. 
Michael D. Hughes, Dale R. Chamberlain, St. George, for 
plaintiff and appellant. 
John Miles, St. George, for defendants and appellees. 
ORME, Court of Appeals Judge: 
Appellant Dixie State Bank seeks review of the trial court's 
award of judgment in the bank's favor. The bank contends 
reversible error was committed in awarding to it a considerably 
lower amount for recoverable attorney fees than was actually 
incurred. We agree and reverse.[fnl] 
FACTS 
The bank loaned Kirk and Linford Bracken $7,695 to purchase a 
1979 pickup truck. The loan was memorialized in a promissory note 
for $10,094.40, which included the full amount which would become 
due, with interest, over the four-year term of the loan. The note 
unambiguously called for monthly installment payments to be made 
by the fifth day of each month for 48 consecutive months. A 
"summary statement" accompanying the note repeated these key 
terms. For the twin purposes of reminding the Brackens to make 
timely payments and assisting the bank in properly crediting the 
payments made, the Brackens were given the customary payment 
coupon book. The coupon book unambiguously contemplated a monthly 
payment schedule. Contemporaneously with the execution of the 
note, the Brackens executed a security agreement by which the 
bank obtained a security interest in the pickup. The Brackens 
made the first four required payments without incident. 
Meanwhile, the loan had been incorrectly set up on the bank's 
internal records. The bank's computer showed the loan as 
requiring semi-annual, rather than monthly, payments. So far as 
the computer was concerned, the four payments made by the 
Brackens did not leave them current as of the fourth month, but 
rather paid ahead by some two years. The bank's confusion came to 
the attention of the Brackens, who chose to cease making 
payments. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Eventually, however, the internal accounting error was 
discovered by bank personnel. With that discovery came the 
realization that the Brackens were many months behind in the 
payments they clearly owed. The bank acquainted the Brackens with 
its discovery and solicited the missing payments. Rather than 
immediately settling up after the error had been discovered, the 
Brackens, no doubt hopeful the computer would again back them up, 
first claimed they really had made all the required payments and 
then tried to convince the bank it was to blame and to work out 
some kind of a deal. Those efforts ultimately failed, and the 
bank repossessed the truck and accelerated the debt. 
Following notice to the Brackens and the Brackens' failure to 
redeem, the truck was sold at private sale pursuant to published 
notice. The Brackens were the high bidders at the sale and bought 
their truck back for $5,000, leaving a substantial deficiency. 
Demand for payment of the deficiency was made. When it was not 
received, the bank commenced suit to recover the balance still 
owing on the loan. Because the note and security agreement both 
contained attorney fee provisions,[fn2] the bank also sought an 
award of attorney fees. 
The Brackens moved to dismiss on grounds of payment, waiver, 
and estoppel. Their supporting affidavit explained that they had 
been informed by bank personnel during the long period of 
non-payment that the loan was current. A battle of affidavits and 
motions to strike ensued, but the motion to dismiss was denied in 
due course. The Brackens answered and included, as part of their 
answer, a counterclaim. The counterclaim alleged that 
repossession of the truck was wrongful[fn3] and damaged the 
Brackens1 "credit reputation." The Brackens claimed the bank had 
acted maliciously. They demanded $5,000 in general damages, 
damages unspecified in amount to reimburse for costs of 
substitute transportation and other costs resulting from the 
repossession, attorney fees, and "punitive damages of $200,000 or 
such larger amount as will serve the traditional purpose of 
punishing the wrongdoer in an amount that will deter future acts 
of the same nature." 
Depositions were noticed and taken and documents requested. The 
case was eventually set for non-jury trial. The Brackens 
persuaded the trial court to continue the trial to permit an 
additional deposition and demanded a jury trial. The deposition 
was taken and the trial reset. Shortly before trial and at the 
request of the Brackens, the jury setting was stricken. At trial, 
the court urged counsel for both sides to confer on settlement 
after hearing opening statements. After a recess was taken for 
that purpose, counsel informed the court that a stipulation had 
been reached. Under its terms, the bank was entitled to judgment 
in the full amount of principal and unpaid interest due on the 
post-sale obligation, plus costs, plus attorney fees in an amount 
found reasonable by the court. In addition, the counterclaim was 
dismissed in its entirety. In exchange for their capitulation, 
the Brackens were given 90 days from its entry during which the 
judgment could not be executed upon. 
The court then took testimony concerning the attorney fees 
issue. Counsel for the bank detailed the efforts he had expended 
on the bank's behalf, emphasizing that most of what he did was a Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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direct result of the defensive posture undertaken by the 
Brackens. He had to meet the motion to dismiss. He had to reply 
to the counterclaim. He had to defend depositions taken by the 
Brackens, and he had to take their depositions in view of the 
magnitude of their counterclaim. He had to prepare for trial, 
including the preparation of jury instructions in view of the 
Brackens1 demand for a jury which was not rescinded until shortly 
before trial. Because of the nature of the counterclaim, "stock" 
jury instructions were of only limited utility and numerous 
"customized" instructions had to be researched and prepared. He 
testified as to the hours he had expended, for which he charged 
$75 per hour, and to some legal research which he hired done at 
$15 per hour. The total fee, he testified, was $4,847.50. He 
adjudged it reasonable. 
Counsel for the Brackens then testified. He opined that a 
reasonable fee for the bank's attorney would be "no more than 
$2,000," using as a point of reference the fee his own clients 
had incurred, which was $1,200. He suggested that the bankfs 
counsel had overreacted by preparing jury instructions pertinent 
to matters not expressly raised in the counterclaim, but conceded 
that the possibility of amendment pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 15(b) made anticipation of those matters plausible. He 
reminded the court of the bank's computer error. He minimized the 
significance of the counterclaim, stating that "the $200,000 
claim was something to give the bank a pause for concern, maybe 
they would suggest a settlement and we would resolve the matter." 
The court determined at the hearing to award only $1,500 as 
attorney fees for the bank, citing public discontent over the 
levels to which attorney fees have risen and the comparatively 
modest amount put in issue by the complaint.[fn4] However, at the 
hearing the court found the total fee claimed by the bank to be 
reasonable. During an exchange with the bank's counsel, the court 
reiterated its finding: 
I made the ruling with respect to your work and 
what you were facing and whether or not it was 
reasonable. I have found your fees to be reasonable. 
. . . I want that in the findings. 
Now, Mr. Hughes, it is clear I have ruled that the 
time you put in, the fees you charged and the 
instructions and work that you did was fair and 
reasonable in light of what you were facing. That's 
almost an exact quote of the finding that the Court 
wants in there. 
As instructed by the court, counsel for the bank prepared 
written findings. Finding No. 15, left unchanged by the court, 
was phrased as follows: 
The Court finds that this sum, to-wit $4,747.50 is -
a reasonable attorney's fee, and adequately 
represents the necessary time and preparation for Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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this case. 
Finding No. 18, as submitted, read as follows: 
The Court finds that the amount of attorney's fees 
claimed of $4,747.50, though reasonable in all 
regard, constitutes a sum approximating the debt due 
on the note, absent any assessment for attorney's 
fees. 
To that finding, but without lining through any of the text as 
submitted, the court added the following phrase, with our 
emphasis added: "[A]nd from the testimony and the file the court 
finds $1,500.00 is a reasonable fee to be assessed against 
[defendants]." 
Taken as a whole, we believe the trial court's intent was to 
find that the fee claimed by the bank was in fact a reasonable 
fee, but that for policy reasons it was appropriate (i.e., 
"reasonable") to assess a lesser amount against the Brackens. 
Justice Howe takes a different interpretation of the trial 
court's pronouncements and concludes that the court actually 
intended to find that $1,500 was a reasonable attorney fee under 
all the circumstances. 
We must accordingly address two issues: first, and assuming our 
construction of the court's various findings is correct, whether 
the trial court erred in awarding substantially less than what it 
determined was a reasonable attorney fee; and second, assuming 
Justice Howe has correctly divined the trial court's position, 
whether the court abused its discretion in finding a reasonable 
fee for the bank to be $1,500. 
Before addressing those issues directly, we pause to review our 
prior decisions in this area and to offer some practical 
guidelines.[fn5] 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
In Utah, attorney fees are awardable only if authorized by 
statute or by contract. Golden Key Realty, Inc. v. Mantas, 
699 P.2d 730, 734 (Utah 1985); Turtle Management, Inc. v. Haggis 
Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 667, 671 (Utah 1982); see Utah Code 
Ann
- § 78-27-56 (1987). If provided for by contract, the award of 
attorney fees is allowed only in accordance with the terms of the 
contract. Trayner v. Cushing, 688 P.2d 856, 858 (Utah 1984) 
(citing Turtle Management, Inc. v. Haggis Management, Inc., 645 
P.2d at 671); see also L & M Corp. v. Loader, 688 P.2d 448, 450 
(Utah 1984) (since contract was not subject of litigation, 
contract provision allowing attorney fees was not applicable). In 
the present case, the note required the Brackens to pay 
reasonable attorney fees in the event of any default or 
acceleration, both of which occurred. 
Calculation of reasonable attorney fees is in the sound 
discretion of the trial court, Jenkins v. Bailey, 676 P.2d 391, 
393 (Utah 1984), and will not be overturned in the absence of a 
showing of a clear abuse of discretion. Turtle Management, Inc. 
v. Haggis Management, Inc., 645 P.2d at 671. However, an award 
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Associated Indus. Dev., Inc. v. Jewkes, 701 P.2d 486, 488 (Utah 
1984); Bangerter v. Poulton, 663 P.2d 100, 103 (Utah 1983); 
see Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1985) ("award 
of attorneys fees must generally be made on the basis of findings 
of fact supported by the evidence and appropriate conclusions of 
law"); Jenkins v. Bailey, 676 P.2d 391, 393 (Utah 1984) (abuse 
of discretion for trial court to award three times more than the 
amount of fees supported by the evidence); Hal Taylor Associates 
v. Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 743, 750-51 (Utah 1982) (since 
party did not present evidence on issue of attorney fees at 
trial, trial court did not commit error in declining to make an 
award). 
Part of the trial court's discretion involves evaluation of the 
evidence presented. In Beckstrom v. Beckstrom, 578 P.2d 520 
(Utah 1978), the attorney testified that the fees were 
appropriately $800, but the trial court awarded only $500. On 
appeal, we upheld the award and explained: "Even though that 
evidence is undisputed, the trial judge was not necessarily 
compelled to accept such self-interested testimony whole cloth 
and make such an award; and in the absence of patent error or 
clear abuse of discretion, this court will not disturb his 
findings and judgment." Id. at 523-24. In addition, the trial 
court is allowed to reduce the amount asserted by one party in 
determining a reasonable fee. See, e.g., Appliance & Heating 
Supply, Inc. v. Telaroli, 682 P.2d 867, 868 (Utah 1984); Sears 
v. Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105, 1110 (Utah 1982). In Alexander v. 
Brown, 646 P.2d 692 (Utah 1982), this Court affirmed a trial 
court's award of attorney fees where the trial court chose the 
middle ground between two estimates of what were reasonable fees. 
Id. at 695. 
PRACTICAL GUIDELINES 
While it is clear that trial courts enjoy broad discretion in 
evaluating evidence to determine what constitutes a reasonable 
fee, there is little Utah law providing practical guidelines for 
this determination.[fn6] A brief discussion of earlier cases that 
have listed factors the trial court should consider in 
determining a reasonable fee is fundamental to our analysis in 
the present case. In Wallace v. Build, Inc., 16 Utah 2d 401, 
402 P.2d 699 (1965), this Court explained that what constitutes a 
reasonable fee is not necessarily controlled by any set formula. 
16 Utah 2d at 405, 402 P.2d at 701. We stated: "What is 
reasonable depends upon a number of factors, the amount in 
controversy, the extent of services rendered and other factors 
which the trial court is in an advantaged position to judge." 
Id. 
In Trayner v. Cushing, 688 P.2d 856 (Utah 1984), this Court 
enlarged the list of potential factors by including "the 
relationship of the fee to the amount recovered, the novelty and 
difficulty of the issues involved, the overall result achieved 
and the necessity of initiating a lawsuit to vindicate the rights 
under the contract." Id. at 858 (citing Turtle Management, 
Inc. v. Haggis Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 667, 671 (Utah 1982)). 
Finally, in Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622 (Utah 1983), 
which contains our most detailed analysis of attorney fees to 
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the difficulty of the litigation, the efficiency of 
the attorneys in presenting the case, the 
reasonableness of the number of hours spent on the 
case, the fee customarily charged in the locality for 
similar services, the amount involved in the case and 
the result attained, and the expertise and experience 
of the attorneys involved. 
Id. at 625. The trial court may also take into account the 
provision in the Code of Professional Responsibility which 
specifies the elements that should be considered in setting 
reasonable attorney fees.[fn7] Id. at 624. 
Although all of the above factors may be explicitly considered 
in determining a reasonable fee, as a practical matter the trial 
court should find answers to four questions: 
1. What legal work was actually performed?[fn8] 
2. How much of the work performed was reasonably 
necessary to adequately prosecute the matter?[fn9] 
3. Is the attorney's billing rate consistent with the 
rates customarily charged in the locality for 
similar services?[fnlO] 
4. Are there circumstances which require 
consideration of additional factors, including 
those listed in the Code of Professional 
Responsibility? 
It is important to note that with this analysis, what an 
attorney bills or the number of hours spent on a case is not 
determinative. See Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d at 624-25. The 
appropriateness of the work actually performed and of the 
attorneyfs billing rate is evaluated before a reasonable fee is 
set. In addition, although the amount in controversy can be a 
factor in determining a reasonable fee, care should be used in 
putting much reliance on this factor. It is a simple fact in a 
lawyer's life that it takes about the same amount of time to 
collect a note in the amount of $1,000 as it takes to collect a 
note for $100,000. As stated in Cabrera: 
The total amount of the attorneys fees awarded in 
this case cannot be said to be unreasonable just 
because it is greater than the amount recovered on 
the contract. The amount of the damages awarded in a 
case does not place a necessary limit on the amount 
of attorneys fees that can be awarded. 
694 P.2d at 625. 
APPROPRIATENESS OF AWARD IN THIS CASE 
The trial court, in our view, found the $4,847.50 fee requested 
by the bank's counsel to be "fair and reasonable" in the 
circumstances. We agree with this determination, which is 
adequately supported in the record, and accordingly find no abuse 
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fees are recoverable by contract or statute and the trial court 
considers all pertinent factors and determines in the exercise of 
its sound discretion that a specific sum is a reasonable fee, it 
is a mistake of law to award less than that amount. Stated 
another way, the trial court has broad discretion in determining 
what constitutes a reasonable fee, and we will consider that 
determination against an abuse-of-discretion standard. However, 
once the trial court makes that determination in the exercise of 
its sound discretion, it commits legal error if it awards less 
than the reasonable fee to which the successful litigant is 
entitled. As explained above, this appears to be just what 
happened here. 
However, we reach the same result even if Justice Howe is 
correct that the trial court meant to find that a reasonable 
attorney fee in this case was $1,500. Such an award would 
constitute an abuse of discretion because the factors mentioned 
by the trial court in discounting the fee, as outlined by Justice 
Howe, are without support in the record or are otherwise 
inappropriate. 
First, while the bankfs fee is large relative to the amount of 
its claim, it is small relative to the counterclaim interposed by 
the Brackens. The Brackens' litigation strategy converted the 
action from a routine collection action of a magnitude such that 
it might have been brought in circuit court into a brouhaha of 
much larger proportions. 
Second, and more importantly, the fees incurred by the bank 
were increased several-fold over what they should have been by 
the tactics employed by the Brackens. It was the Brackens who 
raised unsuccessful motions before answering the complaint. It 
was the Brackens who asserted an unmeritorious counterclaim. It 
was the Brackens who got the first trial setting continued to 
take further depositions and obtain a jury trial. After the 
bank's counsel prepared accordingly, it was the Brackens who 
waived the jury they had earlier demanded. The attorney fees 
incurred by the bank were clearly much higher than they should 
have been in this case; but they were higher because of the 
inconsistent and unmeritorious positions taken by the Brackens -
not because of any extravagance or "overkill" on the bank's part. 
Third, the court's finding that the bank was at fault is not 
supported by any actual evidence. See note 4, supra. Insofar 
as it can be ascertained from the record that the bank's computer 
error played a part in the chain of subsequent events, it is 
likewise clear that it was really the Brackens' effort to take 
advantage of that error, despite the clear requirements of their 
note, summary loan statement, and coupon book, which caused the 
problem that resulted in litigation. 
Accordingly, we reverse the district court's judgment as it 
concerns the award of attorney fees and remand for modification 
of the judgment to include an award of $4,847.50 in attorney fees 
to the bank. 
HALL, C.J., and DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur. 
[fnl] This case was argued, along with two other cases, in St. 
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College was the setting for argument, which was attended by over 
150 people. This occasion marked the first time since statehood 
that this Court has heard cases outside Salt Lake City. This 
historic special session, as well as sessions held in Price and 
Logan, was part of a program called "We the People of Utah," a 
statewide observance of the bicentennial of the United States 
Constitution sponsored jointly by the Utah judiciary and the Utah 
State Bar. 
[fn2] The note, after reciting the events of default, stated: "In 
event of any such default or acceleration, the undersigned, 
jointly and severally, agree to pay to the holder hereof 
reasonable attorney's fees, legal expenses and lawful collection 
costs in addition to all other sums due hereunder." The security 
agreement provision on attorney fees appears to be applicable 
only to fees incurred pre-sale. 
[fn3] The Brackens1 theory appears to have been that the bankfs 
internal computer printout modified the note and converted the 
obligation from one requiring monthly payments of $210.30 to one 
requiring semi-annual payments of $210.30. Because the fifth 
"semi-annual payment" was not yet due when the truck was 
respossessed, the Brackens claimed that the repossession was 
unlawful. The theory poses a number of difficulties, not the 
least of which is that two payments annually of $210.30 each on a 
$7,695 principal obligation bearing interest at 14 percent would 
not be sufficient even to retire current interest. By the year 
2000, the Brackens would have owed the bank $21,485, secured by a 
twenty-one-year-old truck. 
[fn4] The court also purported to find, despite the fact that the 
only testimony received was offered by counsel and was limited to 
the attorney fees issue, that "the initial mistake was made by 
the bank. . . . I want the original mistake to be placed on the 
part of the bank." 
[fn5] Perceiving the need for meaningful guidelines in this area 
for trial courts, litigants, and attorneys, the trial court urged 
that an appeal be taken to this Court: "And, again, I encourage 
you both to take it on appeal. I think it is a case that should 
be addressed by the Supreme Court of the State of Utah with 
respect to fees. I have indicated that I think it is a subject 
that should have some attention to give guidelines, if nothing 
else, to lawyers with similar lawsuits." 
[fn6] In many instances, where the question arises at all, the 
attorney fees issue is treated as incidental by the appellant, 
who focuses on more substantial issues, and has accordingly 
tended to receive the same kind of cursory treatment by us. See, 
e.g., Golden Key Realty, Inc. v. Mantas, 699 P.2d 730, 734 (Utah 
1985); Bangerter v. Poulton., 663 P.2d 100, 103 (Utah 1983). 
This case, which involves only the issue of attorney fees, 
provides us with a unique opportunity to clarify our standards 
for evaluating attorney fees awards against an 
abuse-of-discretion standard. 
[fn7] See Utah Code of Professional Responsibility DR 2-106, in 
effect when the instant case was decided. The factors of a 
reasonable fee listed in 1.5(a) of the Rules of Professional 
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those listed in DR 2-106(B). 
[fn8] Several judicial districts have supplementary rules of 
practice that require affidavits in support of an award of 
attorney fees. These rules require that the attorney specifically 
set forth the nature of the work performed and the number of 
hours spent in prosecuting the claim to judgment or to the stage 
for which the attorney fee is claimed. The affidavit must also 
separately state hours worked by those other than attorneys, with 
an explanation of the time spent, work done, and hourly charge 
billed. See, e.g., Rule 10, Rules of Practice, 2nd Judicial 
District; Administrative Order 23, Rules of Practice, 4th 
Judicial District. These supplementary rules are fully consistent 
with the guidance we outline in the present case. 
[fn9] See Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380, 1384 (Utah 1980) (award 
of fees must rest on evidence of need and reasonableness). Trial 
courts are accustomed to apportioning attorney fees between 
multiple parties and attributing fees to separate causes of 
action. In Turtle Management, Inc. v. Haggis Management, Inc., 
645 P.2d 667, 671 (Utah 1982), the appellant-plaintiff argued 
that it should be awarded the attorney fees expended in 
prosecuting its claim against all defendants because it was 
successful against a single defendant. This Court disagreed, 
stating: "When a plaintiff has a substantial claim against one 
defendant, he should not have a free ride to assert claims 
against other defendants with the expectation that the target 
defendant will end up paying all attorneyfs fees, even those 
related to unsuccessful and perhaps frivolous claims." Id. at 
671. In Paul Mueller Co. v. Cache Valley Dairy Ass'n, 
657 P.2d 1279, 1288 (Utah 1982), the trial court awarded $17,000 in 
attorney fees instead of the $47,000 requested. On appeal, this 
Court upheld the award because the trial court had "sufficient 
information before it in the billing records to enable it to 
separate the [unrecoverable] counterclaim hours from those spent 
in the defense of the main causes of action." Id. at 1288. 
[fnlO] See Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380, 1384-85 (Utah 1980) 
(testimony on the rates commonly charged for divorce actions in 
the community was absent, showing no attempt to characterize the 
requested fees as reasonable). 
HOWE, Associate C.J. (dissenting): 
I dissent. The majority opinion misinterprets the trial court's 
finding on attorney fees and then proceeds to erroneously define 
as an issue whether the trial court erred in "awarding 
substantially less than what it determined was a reasonable fee." 
The majority's error stems from a finding of fact made by the 
trial court which is confused and ambiguous on its face and 
should be interpreted in light of the judge's bench ruling at the 
end of the trial. Finding of fact No. 18, as it was prepared by 
counsel for plaintiff and submitted to the trial judge for 
signature, stated: 
The Court finds that the amount of attorney's fees 
claimed of $4,747.50, though reasonable in all 
regard, constitutes a sum approximating the debt due 
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fees. 
However, before the judge accepted that finding, he added in his 
own handwriting the following: 
And from the testimony and the file the court finds 
$1,500.00 is a reasonable fee to be assessed against 
defendants. 
On its face, the court finds both $4,747.50 and $1,500 to be a 
reasonable fee. That obviously cannot be correct, and resort must 
be had to the judge's pronouncement from the bench when he fixed 
the amount of the fees. He then explained that he did not dispute 
that plaintiff's attorney had expended the hours on the case 
which he claimed and did not dispute that the hourly rate charged 
by plaintiff's attorney was reasonable. He commented that looking 
only at those two factors, the $4,747.50 requested by plaintiff's 
attorney was reasonable. However, he hastened to observe that 
"the Court would find the fees must have some reasonable 
relationship to the amount that can be gained or whatever 
potentially could be lost." The judge further observed that 
defendants' attorney (who had to carry the burden of proof on the 
counterclaim which presented the only issue in the case) 
testified that his fees would only be $1,200. To further explain 
why the court was fixing the fees at $1,500, he gave counsel the 
following example: 
Let me say this to you: You can take two little toy 
cars out and wreck them in the middle of the 
Courtroom and have all of the people in here witness 
it, then take all of their depositions and prepare 
for trial and jury instructions and take the time of 
the Court, and the lawyers can do all those things. 
And when you get down to it, you can try the suit on 
the same basis and principle that would apply in any 
kind of case of similar kind. But keep in mind it was 
just little toy cars out there. And so I find that in 
this case . . . the attorney fee is in relationship 
to the amount to be assessed against the defendant. 
When counsel for plaintiff protested that the $1,500 fee was low, 
the court stated: 
I want in the findings of fact that the initial 
mistake was made by the bank. . . . Well, I want the 
original mistake to be placed on the part of the 
bank. 
Thus, the record before us makes it abundantly clear that the 
trial judge was influenced in setting the fee at $1,500 because 
of the small amount sued upon by plaintiff and the fact that 
plaintiff's mistake with its computer precipitated the 
litigation. The amount sued upon by the bank was $3,858.84. By 
the time judgment was recovered, accrued interest at the rate of 
14 percent per annum had made the amount owing to plaintiff 
$4,748.39. 
The majority opinion states that the trial court found that a 
fee of $4,747.50 was a reasonable fee and then concludes that it 
is a "mistake of law" or the court "commits legal error" if it Digitized by the H ward W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law Scho l, BYU. 
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awards a lesser amount. That simply did not happen here where the 
trial judge, without questioning the hours spent and the 
reasonableness of the hourly rate, found and wrote in his own 
handwriting that under all of the circumstances, $1,500 was a 
reasonable fee. Thus, the only issue for us to determine in this 
case is whether he abused his discretion in fixing the fee at 
that amount. I agree with the majority that the trial court erred 
in giving weight to the fact that an error by the plaintiff bank 
gave rise to this litigation. The bank error was so obvious that 
defendants could not have reasonably relied on it and become 
misled. The majority opinion also correctly states that what an 
attorney bills for the number of hours spent on a case is not 
determinative and that the amount in controversy or, stated 
another way, the relationship of the fee to the amount recovered 
is a factor which should be considered by the trial judge. 
Traynor v. Cushing, 688 P.2d 856, 858 (Utah 1984); Wallace v. 
Build, Inc., 16 Utah 2d 401, 405, 402 P.2d 699, 701 (1965). 
However, by holding that plaintiff should have been awarded the 
whole $4,747.50 claimed, the majority gives no weight at all to 
this factor. See Utah Code of Professional Responsibility 
DR2-106, set out in full in Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622, 
624-25 (Utah 1985), which also lists "the amount involved and the 
results obtained" as a factor to be considered by the court in 
determining the reasonableness of a fee. In fact, the majority, 
by listing the four questions for which the trial court should 
find answers, minimizes this important factor. 
In an attempt to justify the $4,747.50 fee, the majority refers 
to the efforts of bankfs counsel to defend against the 
counterclaim. The difficulty with that reference is that attorney 
fees are recoverable only for legal expenses in collection on the 
promissory note and not for defending counterclaims which may be 
interposed by a debtor in the suit on the note. Stubbs v. 
Hemmert, 567 P.2d 168, 171 (Utah 1977); Nelson v. Newman, 
583 P.2d 601, 603-04 (Utah 1978). Here, the counterclaim was for the 
alleged malicious, tortious acts of the bank. The prayer for 
$200,000 was for punitive damages on account of the tort. 
Clearly, the bank is not entitled to attorney fees for defending 
a tort claim by defendants, and the majority errs in its reliance 
on that factor in attempting to justify the higher fee. 
The majority recognizes that the calculation of a reasonable 
fee is in the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be 
overturned in the absence of a showing of a clear abuse of 
discretion and cites case law in support thereof. One such case 
is Beckstrom v. Beckstrom, 578 P.2d 520, 524 {Utah 1978), where 
the attorney testified that a reasonable fee would be $800, but 
the trial court awarded only $500. On appeal, we upheld the 
award, explaining that although the evidence is undisputed, the 
trial judge was not necessarily compelled to accept such 
self-interested testimony whole cloth and make such an award; and 
in the absence of patent error or a clear abuse of discretion, 
this Court will not disturb his findings and judgment. 
The majority also cites Alexander v. Brown, 646 P.2d 692, 695 
(Utah 1982), where this Court affirmed a trial court's award of 
attorney fees which was a compromise figure between two estimates 
of what was a reasonable fee. Yet in the instant case, the 
majority denies the trial court that same broad discretion and 
orders a substantially higher fee than the court fixed. The Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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majority cites no case, and I have been unable to find any case 
where this Court has so disturbed a trial court's discretion to 
set a fee. 
In the instant case, the bank sued for $3,858.84 plus interest. 
The requested fee was $4,747.50, which the judge reduced to 
$1,500 because an error of the bank gave rise to the dispute and 
because of the small amount owing on the note. Since the court's 
reliance on the error made by the bank was misplaced, I would 
remand this case to the trial court to have the fee fixed absent 
consideration of the bank's error. 
STEWART, J., does not participate herein; GREGORY K. ORME, 
Court of Appeals Judge, sat. 
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